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Problem, research strategy, and 
fi ndings: The contentious politics of the 
demolition of Lafi tte public housing in post-
Katrina New Orleans and its replacement 
with mixed-income properties is a telling 
case of the strategic confl icts housing 
advocates face in public housing revitaliza-
tion.  It reveals how the qualifi ed outcomes 
of HOPE VI interact with local institutional 
and historical circumstances to confound 
the equity and social justice goals of housing 
and community development advocates.  It 
shows the limits to public housing revitaliza-
tion as an urban recovery strategy when 
hostile government leadership characterizes 
a region, and the state is recast as an adver-
sary rather than revitalization partner. This 
case is part of a longer ethnographic project 
on post-Katrina New Orleans recovery.
Takeaway for practice: Housing and 
community development advocacy for 
urban revitalization strategies is limited 
without a supportive state partner to 
endorse and smooth programmatic efforts. 
Public housing revitalization, especially the 
legacy and derivatives of HOPE VI, is 
imbued with multiple, often confl icting 
meanings and expectations across its range 
of stakeholders.  Nonprofi t housing advo-
cates charged with integrating revitalization 
schemes in communities with historic 
government-civil society confl ict can expect 
resistance and challenges from both the state 
and civil society actors.
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Razing Lafi tte
Defending Public Housing From a Hostile State
Leigh Graham
In December 2007, as protesters clashed with police outside City Hall, the New Orleans City Council voted to move forward with the U.S. Depart-ment of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) proposed demolition 
of the Big Four public housing projects, Lafi tte, C. J. Peete, B. W. Cooper, and 
St. Bernard, and their replacement with mixed-income developments. Public 
housing in New Orleans would be reduced by 70% (Browne-Dianis & Sinha, 
2008) as part of a broader privatization effort targeting public schools, hospi-
tals, and housing pushed by the federal government after Hurricane Katrina. 
Local and national resistance to HUD’s plan, announced in June 2006 follow-
ing the August 2005 hurricane and delayed in part by a class action lawsuit 
from former tenants, had been immediate, sustained, and multifaceted. Direct 
action housing activists in New Orleans staged tent cities in protest; nonprofi t 
legislative advocacy coalitions championed federal legislation that would 
require evidence-based plans for phased redevelopment and one-for-one 
replacement with physical units or housing vouchers. Yet, the tenant plaintiffs 
lost, federal legislation stalled in committee, and HUD’s insistence on decon-
centrating the pre-hurricane poverty of New Orleans prevailed in the face of 
severe affordable housing and labor shortages and widespread residential 
displacement. 
In the transformation of New Orleans public housing, nonprofi t organiza-
tions across the urban policy spectrum have been directly involved in the 
debates and efforts to preserve, defend, demolish, and rebuild these former 
public housing sites. The contentious politics surrounding the redevelopment 
of the Lafi tte projects in the historic, African American, central city neighbor-
hood of Tremé, a telling case of the strategic confl icts housing advocates face 
in public housing transformation, is the focus of this analysis (see the map in 
the Appendix). The key actors in this study are national and local community 
development practitioners and their social justice, social service, policy advo-
cacy, labor, academic, and community organizing counterparts who work on 
the long-term recovery of devastated low-income neighborhoods in New 
Orleans. 
This case reveals how the qualifi ed outcomes of the HOPE VI program 
and specifi c institutional and historical circumstances of New Orleans collided 
in the post-Katrina moment to confound strategic opportunities for these 
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nonprofi t organizations. Broader confl icts over mixed-
income housing and the transformation of the nation’s 
public housing stock unfolded in a post-disaster region 
characterized by hostile government leadership and robust 
and punitive policies of privatization. 
Post-Katrina New Orleans presented an historic mo-
ment in which housing, development, and social justice 
advocates felt they had to step in and direct an original 
American city’s recovery in the face of willful federal indif-
ference to its survival. Powerful and energized organiza-
tional leaders entered New Orleans with pledges and 
resources to support unprecedented resident organizing 
and community control of recovery and rebuilding. Yet, 
instead, an antagonistic federal state intent on privatization 
as a recovery strategy forced these nonprofi ts back into 
familiar, well-worn urban development territory: siloed 
revitalization efforts narrowly framed around site develop-
ment. What has emerged as a model public housing revital-
ization project, Faubourg Lafi tte, began as a much-
maligned concession prize for a recovery network of 
organizations committed to a new, transcendent model of 
urban equitable development. 
This analysis is part of a growing body of research 
interrogating the role of the nonprofi t sector in the recovery 
of New Orleans (see, e.g., Arena, 2012; BondGraham, 
2011; Graham, 2010, 2012; Sinha, 2009). This contribu-
tion centers the perspective of the nonprofi ts working in the 
community development fi eld and examines the limitations 
to their practice when the state is the adversary rather than 
the partner. This is a particularly important inquiry when 
evaluating the evolving role of public housing in the United 
States as an affordable housing option for low-income 
urban communities. Public-private partnerships are at the 
core of HOPE VI. What strategic options exist for housing 
and community development nonprofi ts when the state has 
abdicated its responsibilities to low-income communities, as 
was the charge in post-Katrina New Orleans, and civil 
society is forced to pick up the pieces in its absence? 
Data and Methods
This analysis is part of a larger ethnographic project in 
post-Katrina New Orleans from 2005 to 2009 (see espe-
cially Graham, 2010, 2012). I was a participant-observer as 
a consultant and scholar in a loosely affi liated network of 
organizations seeking to build a recovery coalition to re-
build the city’s poorest neighborhoods and bring displaced 
low-income New Orleanians home. I worked with just over 
60 practitioners, activists, consultants, and philanthropists 
representing 28 different organizations focusing on New 
Orleans’s recovery, specifi cally the redevelopment of low-
income, African American neighborhoods and the repatria-
tion of displaced residents. Entities ranged from grassroots, 
informal (i.e., no 501(c)(3) status) emergency action 
groups, to the major labor unions, with philanthropy, 
organizing, and development organizations most common. 
For descriptive purposes, as proxy for insider-outsider 
dynamics and the potential power differentials associated 
with organization size and proximity to centers of power 
(e.g., Washington, DC),1 organizational headquarters and 
2006 assets are briefl y summarized here. These 28 organi-
zations were almost evenly split between the New Orleans 
region and the Northeast.2 Fifteen were based in or around 
New Orleans. Non-local organizations were on average 
larger than local entities. Using 2006 net assets as an 
approximation of organizational resources, the median 
asset base for a New Orleans organization was $6.9 mil-
lion, compared with $37 million for Northeast organiza-
tions.3
In this analysis, a smaller cohort of organizations plays 
a central role and their actions are described in detail here. 
Given that their recovery work is public knowledge, orga-
nizational names are unchanged. However, when quoting 
different actors, I removed organizational affi liations and 
most identity markers to protect anonymity. 
Committing to the “Right to Return” 
of Displaced New Orleanians
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the leadership 
of a range of national nonprofi t community development 
entities, labor unions, policy organizations, and their urban 
planning and development colleagues in academia began 
discussing a coordinated response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Many of these executives led entities with subsidiary 501(c)
(3)s in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast that they now 
were trying to assist, or had been contacted by New 
Orleans groups or the Louisiana government to provide 
recovery technical assistance.4 
These conversations built on leaders’ long-standing 
personal and professional relationships. Although these 
organizations ranged from community development corpo-
rations (CDCs) to foundations to civil rights legal teams, 
their interorganizational and interpersonal relationships 
constitute a loosely cohered recovery network.5 This net-
work developed what social movement scholars call a shared 
injustice frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992; 
Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001), articulating a demonstra-
tive move by the federal government toward urban privati-
zation and permanent displacement of the urban poor from 
New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina’s cause and consequences, 
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that is, the willful federal government indifference to and 
neglect of a unique American city and its most vulnerable 
residents, the majority of them Black and poor, leading to 
their possible permanent displacement and exclusion from 
recovery processes, was the source of moral outrage for these 
organizational actors. This extended toward a shared diag-
nosis that fulfi lling the right to return of the displaced 
should be their primary objective. Indeed, the “‘right of 
return’ of displaced New Orleanians was a claim used by a 
broad range of recovery actors” (Graham, 2012, p. 6); it 
became “the motto of the reconstruction movement, used 
widely within and beyond movement circles” (Luft, 2009, 
p. 516). HUD even incorporated it in its post-Katrina 
redevelopment plans. 
Organizational leaders saw their collective response as 
nothing short of a social movement, grounded in a mutual 
desire to reignite their shared activist histories in Black social 
movements and workers’ and immigrants’ rights campaigns. 
One executive from a national community development 
intermediary characterized New Orleans as the site of “the 
next Civil Rights movement” (personal communication, 
February 20, 2006). A consultant retained by an interna-
tional relief organization to advise on funding grassroots 
recovery and organizing viewed Katrina as “an opportunity 
to organize a strong movement in the South” (personal 
communication, October 25, 2005). A radical left activist in 
New Orleans saw reconstruction as only occurring equitably 
through a “real, popular, pro-working class, anti-racist…
movement developing our own plans, making demands and 
struggling to implement them” (personal communication, 
November 6, 2005). A local grassroots coalition, the People’s 
Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (PHRF), 
saw “movement mobilization nationwide” backing union-
community partnerships envisioning “what kind of society 
we want” as a key ingredient in an equitable recovery re-
sponse (People’s Hurricane Relief Fund & Oversight Com-
mittee, personal communications, September 29, 2005 and 
October 10, 2005). Many scholars and activists called for a 
renewed social movement in the aftermath of Katrina 
(Dawson, 2006; Dreier, 2006a, 2006b; Giroux, 2006; Luft, 
2009; Muhammad, 2006; Sanyika, 2009). These organiza-
tional leaders, including women and men, African Ameri-
can, White, Asian American, based in New Orleans and 
nationwide, believed they could heed this call.
Building a Recovery Coalition in 
Post-Katrina New Orleans
Institutional missions, expertise, cultures, and histories 
shaped the specifi c strategies national and local organiza-
tions aimed to employ in post-Katrina New Orleans. Yet, a 
broadly defi ned, multifaceted goal united organizations 
and encouraged their collaboration: to empower the voices 
of low-income, African American New Orleanians most 
likely to be displaced and left out of post-disaster recovery 
processes, and to rebuild their communities in a more 
equitable, more inclusive, more participatory way. Organi-
zational leaders envisioned sustainable citizen political and 
economic empowerment, by organizing residents to par-
ticipate in recovery planning processes as well as in the 
physical rebuilding process through job training, job 
placement, and ownership investments in community 
assets. Citizen empowerment would necessarily follow 
from carefully designed planning and rebuilding processes 
that provided good jobs, high wages, asset building, and 
citizen decision making and control over their communi-
ties’ recovery. The potential organizational resources avail-
able to this endeavor included philanthropic funds, labor 
union pension funds, union organizing and construction 
skills, union apprenticeship programs, community devel-
opment fi nance and housing production expertise, policy 
expertise and legislative access, and grassroots ties to New 
Orleans neighborhoods that centered Black political power 
and leadership and built on communities’ cultural assets 
and histories.
A major rationale for coalition building was to over-
come the fractious ethno-racial, class, and neighborhood 
politics among community-based groups in New Orleans 
and instead project one loud, demonstrative, and powerful 
voice speaking for the displaced poor (Thompson, 2009). 
Representatives from national and local organizations 
envisioned exerting political power to become a major 
actor in rebuilding on behalf of low-income communities 
of color (personal communication, n.d.).6 At one coalition-
building effort in Washington, DC, in the fall of 2005, 
labor unions, progressive funders, social movement organi-
zations, planning faculty, and grassroots groups debated 
whether they could fi nd a demonstration block to test 
organizing-driven physical redevelopment and meet work-
force development objectives (personal communication, 
November 11, 2005). 
Defending Tremé
Coalition building was driven in part by an abstract 
fear of rampant speculation, land grabs, and backroom 
deals to buy up property in New Orleans that would lead 
to gentrifi cation and permanent displacement (personal 
communication, February 20, 2006). The entire footprint 
of New Orleans seemed up for grabs, considering the 
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fi nancial and leadership bankruptcy of the city encouraged 
a recovery strategy of “rebuild at your own risk” (Gelinas, 
2008) that was particularly welcoming to private-sector 
development. Explained one African American community 
activist and lawyer during a visit from one of the national 
unions, organizers had a responsibility to orient themselves 
and others to “get beyond that every group wants to claim” 
the city and to focus on developing New Orleans “the way 
it could look,” because people did not want to come home 
to what it looked like after Katrina (personal communica-
tion, February 20, 2006). 
These fears, as well as the desire to have a “stake in the 
ground” (personal communication, n.d.) around which 
resident-led reconstruction would unfold, privileged land 
acquisition as a strategy within the coalition. Moderately 
damaged and geographically central low-income African 
American neighborhoods seemed particularly at risk for 
speculation and gentrifi cation. Their proximity to down-
town, moderate hurricane damage, and position on the 
higher ground of the city also made them desirable sites for 
resident-led, equitable development strategies. Tremé stood 
out as the site for a demonstration or model initiative, 
following the recommendation in November 2005 of a 
local CDC leader advising national organizations about 
their entrée to New Orleans (personal communication, 
n.d.). From an initial site visit in New Orleans, one plan-
ning colleague wrote:
Tremé has access to a large number of services, abuts 
the French Quarter, and is facing severe pressure for 
gentrifi cation. It is bisected by a freeway entrance that 
separates what is now called Back of Town from the 
section currently known as Tremé though both are 
historically part of the area. The back of town area had 
a great deal of potential for targeted redevelopment. 
Really nice architecture, signifi cant fl ood damage, 
strong historical presence (birthplace of jazz), etc. This 
is an area that could be well served as a model and will 
be almost immediately reknit into the city’s fabric. If 
we can fi gure out how to do something there, it could 
then be transferred to some of the other neighbor-
hoods that are not as well connected, like the lower 
9th…All in all, from a real estate perspective, the 
Central City and the Tremé make a great deal of sense 
as focused areas for redevelopment. (personal commu-
nication, November 3, 2005)
Tremé is one of the most historic Black neighborhoods 
in the United States, home to the fi rst free people of color 
in the United States. It is home to the largest Black 
Catholic congregation in the United States and is the 
historic heart of the Creole community in New Orleans. It 
was also cut in half by highway construction (I-10) in the 
era of Urban Renewal, losing its vibrant Black business 
corridor and suffering from economic and urban decline in 
the decades that followed. Given its historical signifi cance, 
relative damage, and geographic location, the opportunity 
to redevelop Tremé in partnership with residents seemed 
highly symbolic and important to national and local orga-
nizations as the recovery process unfolded. Tremé was “the 
community to organize,” explained one national commu-
nity development leader, as the “easiest quick win” and as a 
priority neighborhood in the plan put forth by Mayor Ray 
Nagin’s recovery planning body, the Bring New Orleans 
Back (BNOB) Commission (personal communication, 
February 20, 2006; March 7, 2006). 
As the months passed and strategic planning and coali-
tion building continued, the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and 
the national community development intermediary Enter-
prise Community Partners were both moving forward in 
their efforts to make a long-term and deep commitment to 
New Orleans. Enterprise had partnered with the New 
Orleans-based Catholic Charities, the largest social service 
provider in the region that was rebounding rapidly in the 
face of tremendous need. The AFL-CIO and Enterprise and 
Catholic Charities both hoped to build in New Orleans new 
organizational and housing production capacity, new afford-
able housing, and a stronger, more empowered workforce 
and neighborhoods. For Enterprise and Catholic Charities, 
“no net loss of affordable housing” (personal communica-
tion, n.d.) in rebuilding was a professional and moral im-
perative. Enterprise and Catholic Charities together 
launched Providence Community Housing, a citywide 
nonprofi t community development corporation to carry out 
housing redevelopment activities. The AFL-CIO planned to 
incorporate community-based organizations into a proposed 
billion-dollar economic development initiative. 
To Raze or Re-Open Lafi tte?
When Katrina struck, the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans (HANO) was under federal receivership, making 
HUD the primary local agency responsible for public 
housing in the city. Since Katrina, local and national 
groups had watched HUD’s actions and inactions around 
public housing carefully and with growing anger. Rumors 
abounded about HUD’s plans for the city’s public housing, 
especially at the four sites the agency boarded up and 
fenced off in December 2005, including the Lafi tte 
development in Tremé (see Figure 1).
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HUD’s decision to seal off select projects was de-
scribed by one CDC leader in New Orleans as “criminal” 
and “effectively preventing any public housing resident 
from returning to NOLA.” This person hoped that “there 
is a group of lawyers who are taking this issue on” 
(personal communication, December 7, 2005). (At the 
time, attorneys from the Loyola Law Clinic were fi elding 
calls from displaced tenants about if and when they would 
be able to come home.) Similarly, following a housing 
subcommittee meeting of the BNOB Commission in early 
November, a colleague reported that “there was an interest-
ing discussion that centered on people [angered] by the 
notion that mixed-income neighborhoods were intended 
to replace poor neighborhoods, and that poor people were 
not going to get the same proportion of units in the re-
built New Orleans as they had pre-Katrina” (personal 
communication, November 4, 2005). Some organizations 
in this recovery coalition believed that HUD would pursue 
rehabilitation or modest redevelopment to public housing, 
including Lafi tte, and that private-sector partners for 
planning, redevelopment, and organizing would be needed 
and welcome. But, for the most part, in the post-disaster 
climate of a reticent and impassive federal state, with 
asymmetries of information and innuendo and confusion, 
most private-sector organizations were trying to devise 
recovery strategies based on little or unconfi rmed 
information. 
Summer 2006 saw a series of high-profi le announce-
ments and plans that effectively signed off recovery control 
for Tremé/Lafi tte to a national–local coalition of nonprof-
its. Over a series of meetings unfolding in the spring of 
2006, the AFL-CIO, Enterprise, Providence, MIT urban 
planning faculty and students, Tulane architecture faculty, 
Ujamaa CDC in Tremé, and other organizations had 
Figure 1. Lafi tte development, December 2007, Tremé, New Orleans.
Source: Karen Apricot, by permission.
(Color fi gure available online.)
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developed a cohesive vision for a coalition-led neighbor-
hood redevelopment process in Tremé that integrated 
resident organizing, community planning, and the acquisi-
tion of blighted and adjudicated properties (Brown, 2006). 
During this strategic planning phase, it was still unclear 
what might happen to Lafi tte. 
Two major initiatives were disclosed on June 14, 2006. 
The AFL-CIO announced a $1 billion “housing and eco-
nomic development” commitment to New Orleans, its Gulf 
Coast Revitalization Program, “…the fi rst major infusion of 
private capital into the Gulf Coast since [the 2005] hurri-
canes. In the absence of meaningful help from the federal 
government, the AFL-CIO project is expected to open the 
door for other substantial investments in rebuilding the area” 
(Parks, 2006). The program launched in Tremé with a 
proposed partnership with the newly formed Providence 
Community Housing, MIT, and others to redevelop 196 
adjudicated and blighted properties there. On that same day, 
HUD announced its plans to “use a mix of federal public 
housing funding HANO receives annually, as well as bond 
funds and Low Income Housing Tax Credits to redevelop 
C.J. Peete, B.W. Cooper, Lafi tte and St. Bernard, which 
endured moderate to severe damage. The units will be 
demolished to make way for a mixture of public housing, 
affordable rental housing and single-family homes” (White, 
2006). The 896 units in Lafi tte would face the wrecking 
ball, to be replaced by mixed-income properties. Combined 
with the almost 200 properties the AFL-CIO and Provi-
dence proposed to redevelop, the residential built environ-
ment of Tremé/Lafi tte would be substantially transformed.
Two weeks later, The Advancement Project, a national 
civil rights advocacy organization, and a team of local 
attorneys, including those at Loyola Law Clinic who had 
been previously organizing displaced tenants, fi led a class 
action lawsuit against HUD and HANO on behalf of 
public housing tenants, citing U.S. housing policy, consti-
tutional rights, and international human rights law as 
grounds for residents’ right to return to their homes and 
the right to participate in recovery efforts (Anderson v. 
Jackson, 2006). Six weeks later, in early August 2006, the 
AFL-CIO and Providence-led organizational team was 
awarded the 196 adjudicated and blighted properties for 
redevelopment in Tremé and the Tulane/Gravier neighbor-
hood. Shortly before the fi rst anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, in late August, Enterprise Community Partners 
and Providence Community Housing (hereafter Provi-
dence/Enterprise, per their materials) were revealed as the 
nonprofi t redevelopment team to transform Lafi tte. Provi-
dence/Enterprise, despite HUD’s wishes, committed to 
one-for-one replacement that would ensure one physical 
unit built for each one that was demolished. 
Fulfi lling the Right to Return 
for Lafi tte Tenants
The responses to HUD’s demolition plans by The 
Advancement Project and its civil rights colleagues versus 
Providence/Enterprise refl ected competing approaches to 
fulfi lling displaced tenants’ right to return to New Orleans. 
Both strategies began from the perspective that the state 
was willfully discriminating against low-income Black New 
Orleanians by refusing to reopen structurally sound, mod-
erately damaged, public housing.7 Both approaches built 
on the belief that civil society organizations must step in to 
repatriate displaced New Orleanians and help them rebuild 
their lives, in effect acting as a “quasi-government” (per-
sonal communication, n.d.) since the Bush Administration 
had demonstrably abdicated its responsibilities to the most 
vulnerable Katrina survivors. 
These convictions and associated strategic actions have 
multiple foundations, for the legal team, the U.S. Fair 
Housing Act, the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, international 
law, and the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution all mandate HUD and HANO repair and reopen 
public housing so that “internally displaced” tenants may 
come home and “rebuild their lives” (Anderson v. Jackson, 
2006). HUD and HANO’s intent to demolish and shrink 
the public housing stock was discriminatory, in violation of 
tenants’ right to equal protection under the Constitution, 
and in violation of the state’s responsibility to rehouse 
“internally displaced persons” under international law 
(Anderson v. Jackson, 2006). For the nonprofi t housing 
development team, contracting with HUD to redevelop 
Lafi tte was the most pragmatic way to ensure that the most 
residents had the right to return in the foreseeable future, 
in part by making an irreducible commitment to one-for-
one unit replacement and resident participation. 
To these developers skilled in mixed-income redevelop-
ment, affordable housing production, and community 
development fi nance, the right of return was “empty rheto-
ric” without available physical units, and affordable housing 
would be the pragmatic, just, and ultimately empowering 
means for fulfi lling this right (personal communication, 
n.d.). Indeed, Providence/Enterprise made clear in their 
press materials that they were not involved in HUD and 
HANO’s “decision to demolish Lafi tte,” but that they “got 
involved to ensure that residents have a voice in the rebuild-
ing of their community” (“Providence/Enterprise Plan,” 
2008). Tenants now had absolute opportunity to return to 
Tremé and New Orleans, if desired (“Providence/Enterprise 
Partnership,” n.d.). In conjunction with the adjudicated 
properties awarded for redevelopment, the Lafi tte contract 
gave Providence and its partners substantial control over the 
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housing stock in Tremé/Lafi tte, whose redevelopment this 
coalition viewed as the best path toward the “equitable, 
affordable and sustainable” community that would now 
fl ourish in post-Katrina Tremé (“Providence/Enterprise 
Plan,” 2008).
Despite the shared injustice frame initially held by this 
recovery network, these competing strategies of legal action 
versus redevelopment opened up deep rifts among these 
loosely cohered organizations. The legal team and the 
nonprofi t developers both asserted that they were honoring 
residents’ desires and intent. Challenging HUD and 
HANO in court refl ected the justifi able mistrust of local 
public housing residents that the housing agencies had 
their best interests in mind, a distrust steeped in the tor-
tured history of the 1996 HOPE VI redevelopment of St. 
Thomas public housing into River Garden, a mixed-in-
come site. “Using federal HOPE VI funds and private 
money, the St. Thomas project [had] been redeveloped as 
River Garden, a physically attractive New Urbanist, mixed-
income neighborhood in which, controversially, fewer than 
one in fi ve former public housing households [were able] 
to return” (Graham, 2009). An African American social 
justice activist in New Orleans explained that St. Thomas:
…was a very historic neighborhood and one of the 
hearts of the Black Indian and Second Line Traditions. 
It was a very traumatic experience when it was torn 
down and the people forced out. The area was also the 
site of many community protest [sic] for rights, against 
the police and the city government. When they moved 
people into the St. Bernard housing project, it started a 
wave of violence in that neighborhood, because the St. 
Thomas was an uptown project now being placed in 
the St. Bernard, a downtown project also part of the 
7th ward which doesn’t mix with the St. Thomas or 
the 10th ward in which it was located. (personal 
communication, November 7, 2005)
Critically, the community development sector was 
implicated in the St. Thomas redevelopment; a local CDC 
leader explained that a powerful private-sector developer in 
the city, Joseph Canizaro 
owned all the land around the St. Thomas Housing 
project (large Hope VI) and he started a CDC that 
could bring all the important community interests to 
the table. He used this convening as a vehicle to buy 
off important community fi gures. Then he pushed 
through the development and dropped funding from 
the nonprofi t. (personal communication, November 3, 
2005)
Canizaro now co-chaired Nagin’s BNOB Commission, the 
recovery committee responsible for the Urban Land Insti-
tute’s infamous green dot plan interpreted by New Orleani-
ans as returning certain neighborhoods to nature (Olshansky 
& Johnson, 2010). Canizaro was a major developer in the 
city and a friend of and major donor to President Bush and 
described by a local, African American community develop-
ment leader as “the most dangerous person in the city” 
(personal communication, November 3, 2005).
In New Orleans, because of the trauma and injustice 
associated with the St. Thomas redevelopment, federal 
policies of income mixing and poverty deconcentration 
were viewed with outright hostility by many local activists 
and residents. This “traditional urban planning idea,” one 
local social justice activist explained, disrespected the “cul-
tural identity of [New Orleanians] as attached to neighbor-
hoods and land base” (peronal communication, September 
15, 2005.). He warned against the growing enthusiasm of 
the state, academics, and policymakers for reinvigorating 
the deconcentration paradigm in New Orleans:8
...it goes without saying that [in New Orleans] you will 
live forever, in the neighborhood you grew up in and 
your parents grew up in. 7th ward for life. There is no 
consideration of leaving the neighborhood to live in 
another part of town. That in itself is traumatic when 
it does happen as we recently saw [with] the ST. [sic] 
Thomas…Violence escalated, as the communal identi-
ties clashed, and people never really integrated into the 
downtown community…so the mixed income idea is 
awash if people can’t return to their communal space. 
(personal communication, September 15, 2005)
This Nagin-Canizaro-Bush connection and its rela-
tionship to past and future public housing outcomes in 
New Orleans epitomized the political and institutional 
networks that residents and community groups had long 
distrusted. New Orleans community organizations strug-
gled to overcome histories of racial, cultural, and neighbor-
hood-based confl icts with one another in competition for 
scarce resources. They struggled to work in good faith with 
outsiders and were particularly suspicious of institutional 
power. Systemic poverty and inequality in New Orleans 
over hundreds of years—from slavery, from Jim Crow, 
from public housing and urban renewal and HOPE VI, 
from patterns of development that shunted African Ameri-
cans disproportionately to low-lying, vulnerable neighbor-
hoods, from prior government malfeasance against African 
Americans in the face of fl oods (e.g., Barry, 1998) —led to 
a deeply ingrained, widely held suspicion in New Orleans 
of government, “experts,” and their resources. 
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Both the City of New Orleans and the State of 
Louisiana had long been riddled with government cor-
ruption, adding to the degree of distrust. As Lowe (2006) 
writes, civil society organizations had to fl ourish “in spite 
of the political situation” in New Orleans (p.73). In the 
aftermath of one of the worst natural disasters in the 
United States, where accusations of shocking, degrading, 
and mortal ineptitude by the Bush Administration were 
widespread (Alter, 2005; Kurtz, 2005; Polman, 2005; 
Sullivan, 2005; Thomas, 2005), HUD and HANO’s 
move to undertake the “largest demolition in the city’s 
history” (Browne-Dianis & Sinha, 2008) in the face of 
ongoing displacement, affordable housing scarcity, and 
labor shortages was both unbelievable and of a piece of 
the state’s response to Katrina. For vulnerable, displaced 
public housing tenants, legal action seemed the only and 
the most just recourse to get home to New Orleans.
That Providence/Enterprise had the support of the 
“City of New Orleans Offi ce of Recovery Management and 
Offi ce of the Mayor, Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, 
State of Louisiana Offi ce of Community Development, 
Louisiana Recovery Authority, and many neighborhood 
groups and collaborators” could only serve to alienate the 
residents and their organizational allies who believed that 
these state entities acted in mainly discriminatory and 
violent ways toward low-income Black New Orleanians 
(“Providence/Enterprise Plan,” 2008). Yet, Providence/
Enterprise, in a rigorously documented public effort, had 
made contact with 650 former Lafi tte households by 2008, 
working with them on site planning, providing social 
services, and hearing residents’ intent to return or move on 
with their lives elsewhere (“Providence/Enterprise Plan,” 
2008). 
Project documents asserted the partnership’s “unsur-
passed local credibility,” given Catholic Charities’ presence 
in New Orleans since 1727, and the “technical expertise 
and access to fi nancial resources necessary to carry out 
planning and redevelopment of this magnitude in a 
timely, effi cient and equitable manner” (“Providence/
Enterprise Partnership,” n.d.). This position did not 
dispute local characterizations of HUD and HANO as 
willfully harmful toward former tenants, especially evident 
in the nonprofi ts’ care to distance themselves from the 
“decision to demolish Lafi tte” (“Providence/Enterprise 
Plan,” 2008) but it, nonetheless, positioned the develop-
ment partnership as best equipped to honor residents’ 
right to return through its centuries-long roots in New 
Orleans providing affordable housing and social services 
and unparalleled housing and fi nance expertise, including 
in similar HOPE VI projects around the United States.9 
Lafi tte as Referendum on HOPE VI
The confl icting strategies of The Advancement Project 
legal team and the Providence/Enterprise redevelopment 
partnership are nested in larger debates over public housing 
policy in the United States, particularly the transformation 
of public housing via the federal HOPE VI program of the 
last two decades. Graham (2012) details the confl ict among 
housing and community development practitioners over 
public housing demolition and the construction of mixed-
income projects, and the broader debates within the fi eld 
over the deconcentration thesis. One of the primary con-
cerns with HOPE VI public housing revitalization, as it is 
known, is the net loss of original tenants from the rebuilt 
sites. Popkin, Levy, and Buron (2009) fi nd that 60–70% of 
tenants never return to former sites, and a portion of 
residents disappear from housing authorities’ rolls entirely. 
HOPE VI has also spurred an unfortunate following by 
municipalities around the country, who are pursuing 
public housing demolition with minimal consideration for 
the services and counseling encouraged in the HOPE VI 
model. 
Yet, support from policymakers, academics, and hous-
ing developers for mixed-income communities persists, due 
to enduring beliefs that it is a mutual strategy of poverty 
alleviation and urban development (Joseph, Chaskin, & 
Webber, 2007), despite HOPE VI’s qualifi ed success. In 
their review of the oft-cited theoretical bases for mixed-
income housing, Joseph et al. (2007) conclude:
…there is a compelling rationale for mixed-income 
development that has nothing to do with lifting fami-
lies out of poverty and is simply based on enabling the 
private development of valuable inner city real estate. 
Assuming for the moment that there are a signifi cant 
number of mixed-income developers for whom pov-
erty alleviation is a goal, more clarity is needed about 
which pathways of change those developers and their 
partners intend to promote…given the multiplicity of 
partners involved in any single, mixed-income devel-
opment effort—private and nonprofi t developers, 
public agencies, social service providers, community 
partners, lenders—there are likely to be a multiplicity 
of expectations, in some cases contradictory. (2007, 
p. 397)
This “multiplicity of expectations” was evident in 
post-Katrina New Orleans, as some housing and civil rights 
activists came to view their former nonprofi t and planning 
allies as “at best, disingenuous” (Sinha, 2009) in their 
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advocacy and at worst, actively working against Lafi tte 
residents to “take away their homes and prolong their exile” 
(Graham, 2006b). The often contradictory outcomes of 
public housing revitalization, that is, the disturbing rates of 
displacement and permanent loss of deeply affordable units 
versus upgraded housing stock and the potential stimula-
tion of economic development, meant that in an already 
contentious and vulnerable environment like New Orleans, 
with legitimate distrust of state-sponsored programs and 
the experts and nonprofi ts who deliver them, the ability to 
reach agreement on how best to preserve community assets 
and fulfi ll the right to return was ill fated. 
HUD’s aggressive and myopic insistence on public 
housing demolition is central to this coalition’s collapse 
and to the unusual degree of attention paid and resistance 
to the future of the Big Four. For organizations within this 
recovery network, the fate of New Orleans public housing 
was an equity and racial justice issue. HUD and HANO 
had housed about 5,100 families in public housing prior to 
Katrina (Filosa, 2006).10 These displaced tenants, along 
with other renters, were signifi cantly underrepresented in 
the city’s and state’s recovery plans despite disproportionate 
damage to the city’s rental housing stock (Clark & Rose, 
2007) and the pre-Katrina reality that 57% of residents 
were renters.11 
Furthermore, former public housing tenants in New 
Orleans epitomized the undesirable residents elites wanted 
to see permanently cast out of the new New Orleans that 
would rise from Katrina’s waste. As Baton Rouge area GOP 
Congressman Richard Baker exulted to the New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, “We fi nally cleaned up public housing in 
New Orleans…We couldn’t do it, but God did” (Hirsch & 
Levert, 2009, p. 212). HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson 
declared New Orleans unlikely “to be as Black as it was for 
a long time, if ever again” and that “[o]nly the best [public 
housing] residents should return,” i.e., those with jobs who 
paid their rent on time (Anderson v. Jackson, 2006). Powell 
(2007) recounts 
One of Nagin’s closest advisers and richest contribu-
tors, James Reiss, said as much in an unguarded com-
ment to the Wall Street Journal a few weeks following 
Katrina: “Those who want to see this city rebuilt want 
to see it done in a completely different way: demo-
graphically, geographically and politically…I’m not 
just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been 
living is not going to happen again or we’re out.” 
(p. 865)
Public housing in New Orleans is architecturally, 
culturally, and historically signifi cant (MacCash, 2011; 
Ouroussoff, 2007). The city was home to some of the 
earliest projects in the nation, and amid the city’s intense 
resident and economic segregation, public housing projects 
were highly visible and symbolic tight-knit physical and 
social communities within a city organized entirely around 
dense, close kin and neighborhood networks. The physical 
structures took on outsized meaning in the recovery pro-
cess and in HUD’s demolition plans, imbued by the people 
and networks that lived in them over generations. Kingsley 
(2007) writes, “Buildings and their neighborhoods were 
the settings where New Orleanians defi ned their identity, 
developed their customs and rituals, and understood their 
sense of place. After Katrina disrupted those histories and 
memories, people looked to their buildings and neighbor-
hoods even more desperately” (p. 719). I witnessed this 
attachment at a planning meeting in Tremé, where people 
spoke about the Lafi tte buildings as if the structures them-
selves were their neighbors.
As organizations attempted to cohere around a shared 
recovery strategy, the lack of a supportive state apparatus to 
smooth their efforts not only complicated implementing 
this vision, but also centered on HUD as the primary 
challenger to empowering residents and their expert orga-
nizational allies to rebuild their communities. Given HUD 
and HANO’s “history of mismanagement, neglect, gentri-
fi cation and displacement in New Orleans” (Graham, 
2012, p. 6),12 the comparative lack of rights and voice for 
the poorest, displaced New Orleanians and the relative lack 
of storm damage to the brick projects compared to the 
private rental housing market, the struggle over public 
housing grew into an outsized, symbolic battleground over 
the rights of the poor in the new New Orleans, their rights 
to the city, to housing, to participation in the recovery 
process, and to their bodily and community autonomy. 
Indeed, the confl ict over public housing in New Orleans 
coincided with the growing critique and resistance to 
policies of deregulation and privatization that result in 
gentrifi cation and displacement in low-income communi-
ties nationwide, and with the call for alternative policies 
and solutions (see, e.g., Bratt, Stone, & Hartman, 2006; 
Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008; 
“Harrisburg Housing Authority,” 2007; Mays, 2007; Peck, 
2006; Right to the City Alliance, 2010; Shortt, 2007; 
Slater, 2006). 
Activists mobilized around preserving public housing, 
arguing that it is a barometer for society’s commitment to 
safe and affordable housing for everyone, and an indispens-
able safety net tool for the poor, as one of the few housing 
policy arenas still relatively insulated from the vagaries of 
the market (Right to the City Alliance, 2010). The struggle 
over public housing in New Orleans became linked up in 
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the years following Katrina with national and international 
movements for the right to cities as diverse, accessible, 
integrated, public spaces, and affordable, safe, vibrant 
places for all strata of society. 
Coda: Faubourg Lafi tte
Lafi tte site redevelopment was delayed for several years 
after the bottom fell out of the tax credit market during the 
recent housing crisis. Today, the new Faubourg Lafi tte is 
rising on Lafi tte’s former footprint, supplemented by a mix 
of scattered site housing around Tremé to integrate the site 
into the community (see Figures 2 and 3).  
Providence/Enterprise brought virtually everything to 
the redevelopment that housing advocates call for in public 
housing revitalization: one-for-one replacement with a 
physical unit; resident participation in site planning and 
tenant leadership for the new site; wrap-around supportive 
services for returning and neighboring residents; reliance 
on local organizations for organizing and social service 
provision; integration of the site plan into the overall built 
environment of the neighborhood; and deep expertise in 
housing fi nance, public housing revitalization, and delivery 
of social services in a culturally sensitive manner. 
Yet, this model redevelopment was extremely conten-
tious and hard won in the aftermath of Katrina. It un-
folded within historically, institutionally, and contextually 
rooted resistance to public housing transformation, radiat-
ing outward from New Orleans via nationwide advocacy 
networks and embodied in protest, litigation, and even 
sustained legislative advocacy aimed at stopping or at least 
Figure 2. Lafi tte demolition, in the spring of 2008, Tremé, New Orleans.
Source: Karen Apricot, by permission.
(Color fi gure available online.)
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slowing down HUD and HANO. The rhetoric of the 
recovery network profi led here, that of stepping in as a 
quasi-government, of confronting the exposed inequities of 
global capitalism and the South’s apartheid economy, of 
building a movement for the most important period of 
urban restoration since Reconstruction, all suggested 
grander recovery ambitions than site revitalization plans 
and litigation. Of course, in the moments and months 
after disasters, rhetoric is fi ery, aspirations are bold, and 
solidarity is in rich supply. Furthermore, GOP control of 
the White House and both houses of Congress when 
Katrina struck suggested strenuous obstacles to any liberal 
or progressive redevelopment plans. 
But implicit in the deeper critiques of Katrina’s expo-
sure of decades of anti-urban bias, institutional inequality 
and racial and economic injustice was an admission that 
past urban revitalization strategies had been insuffi cient. 
Sure, New Orleans would benefi t from even basic invest-
ments in housing, jobs, and education, but what it really 
demanded was new models of human, physical, and com-
munity development. Beginning with mobilization across 
the Katrina diaspora, combined with strong local represen-
tation and underwritten by substantial resources from 
national supporters and advisers, this diverse coalition of 
organizations believed they had the knowledge, connec-
tions, and resources to fi nally bring such an integrated 
vision of organized community control and redevelopment 
leadership to bear in this historic moment. 
Unfortunately, the coalition operated within a hostile 
and chaotic post-fl ood political environment in which local 
and national social justice activists believed that Katrina 
had given cover to policymakers and their private-sector 
Figure 3. Faubourg Lafi tte.
Source: Editor B, http:b.rox.com/, by permission.
(Color fi gure available online.)
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allies to remove a signifi cant portion of the city’s undesir-
able, seemingly intractable, pre-storm features utilized 
mainly by the working and very poor, that is, its failing 
public school system, its hulking public hospital, and its 
public housing projects (see, e.g., Arena, 2007; Graham, 
2006b). Furthermore, available for recovery were an 
abundance of tax credits and large tracts of publicly owned 
land formerly sheltering the poorest New Orleanians. 
Organizational actors with housing and real estate expertise 
were uniquely advantaged in this landscape, and they 
struggled to put their fi nancial and political resources to 
equitable use for displaced New Orleanians. As one advo-
cate suggested, 
…Low-income, marginalized, dispersed populations 
need organized, active, persistent representation so 
they don’t get left out of this…those of us who can 
accumulate large parcels of land in certain neighbor-
hoods, for large-scale redevelopment efforts, need to 
incorporate community organizing into planning and 
redevelopment to drive reconstruction…” (Graham, 
2006a; italics in original)
At the aforementioned planning meeting in Tremé, an 
elderly African American resident and public housing 
activist accused the planners of leading a process that 
would end up “just like St. Thomas,” where “those people 
are totally gone” (personal communication, n.d.). Visions 
of demonstration blocks hosting new models of equitable 
development gave way to a public housing revitalization 
contract and class-action lawsuit, as the coalition’s bold 
plans for a transformed Tremé and New Orleans narrowed 
and clouded in the face of HUD’s determination to un-
build its own pioneering housing legacy in New Orleans.
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Notes
1. Davis (1999) argues that organizational differences in distance to the 
state results in certain organizations versus others being more institu-
tionally aligned and enjoying more cooperative or accessible relation-
ships with the state or being institutionally more powerful to challenge 
the state.
2. Two were headquartered in the Bay Area of California, and the 
remaining 11 were headquartered along the Boston–Washington 
corridor.
3. The mean asset base was $1.36 billion for the Northeast organiza-
tions, due in part to the enormous endowments of two national founda-
tions. It was $27 million for New Orleans-based organizations. The 
range across the entire 28 organizations is from a negative net worth of 
$2 million to over $11 billion in assets.
4. For instance, activists from Community Labor United (CLU) in New 
Orleans reached out to faculty allies in the Department of Urban 
Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) for recovery resources and support. CLU would go on to become 
the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (PHRF), 
and sought technical and strategic assistance in the fi rst weeks after the 
fl ood around building a political response to what was quickly being 
framed as a manmade disaster resulting from government failure and 
neglect (e.g., Thomas, 2005).
5. Please see Wellman (1983), Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi (2010), 
Diani (2003), and Klandersman and Oegema (1987) for network 
defi nitions. Please see Ferguson and Stoutland (1999) for a similar 
analysis of the community development system.
6. Personal communications are gleaned from my fi eld notes as a 
practitioner and scholar in post-Katrina New Orleans, including 
communications such as meeting notes, e-mails, records of conversa-
tions, etc. Occasionally, and regrettably, these materials were not dated.
7. MIT Professor of Architecture John Fernandez provided expert 
witness testimony in Anderson v. Jackson (2006) about the sound 
structural condition of the Big Four.
8. At the time of this exchange, a scholar’s petition titled “Moving to 
Opportunity in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina” (Briggs et al., 2005) 
was circulating online. It best embodies the appetite for deconcentration 
strategies, though it did not call explicitly for public housing demoli-
tion. Also see The Brookings Institution (2005).
9. The Enterprise Social Investment Fund has been a frequent private 
development partner in HOPE VI nationwide.
10. In total, HUD housed about 14,000 families prior to Katrina, with 
5,100 in public housing and 9,000 using vouchers, a population of 49,000 
people that was more than 10% of the city’s population (Filosa, 2006).
11. The state devoted the vast majority of its Community Development 
Block Grant redevelopment funds ($10.4 billion) to making homeown-
ers whole to rebuild their properties, allocating only about $1 billion to 
rental properties, especially $852 million to small rental property 
owners, refl ecting the relative lack of large, multifamily properties in the 
city. An additional $1.7 billion in low-income housing tax credits was 
set aside for large, mixed-income developments (Public meeting at the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in New Orleans, LA, July 11, 2006).
12. Activists working with displaced public housing residents post-
Katrina estimate that “half of the working poor, elderly and disabled 
who lived in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina have not returned. 
Because of critical shortages in low-cost housing, few now expect tens of 
thousands of poor and working people to ever be able to return home” 
(Evans, 2008).
References
Alter, J. (2005, September 19). The other America. Newsweek. Re-
trieved from http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2005/09/18/
the-other-america.html
Anderson v. Jackson, C.A. No. 06-3298 (E.D. La. 2006). Retrieved 
August 29, 2010, from http://www.nhlp.org/system/fi les/private/04+An
derson+Complaint+FINAL.pdf 
Arena, J. (2007, July 13). New Orleans, public housing, and the 
non-profi t industrial complex. New Orleans Indymedia. Retrieved 
RJPA_A_738143.indd   477 11/26/12   8:16:07 AM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
n J
ay
 C
oll
eg
e o
f C
rim
ina
l J
us
tic
e],
 [L
eig
h G
rah
am
] a
t 1
3:2
0 1
2 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
478 Journal of the American Planning Association, Autumn 2012, Vol. 78, No. 4
August 29, 2010, from http://neworleans.indymedia.org/
news/2007/07/10552.php 
Arena, J. (2012). Driven from New Orleans: How nonprofi ts betray public 
housing and promote privatization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Barry, J. (1998). Rising tide: The great Mississippi fl ood of 1927 and how 
it changed America. New York, NY: Touchstone.
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social 
movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 
26, 611–639.
BondGraham, D. (2011). Building the new New Orleans: Foundation 
and NGO power. Review of Black Political Economy. 38(4), 279–309.
Bratt, R., Stone, M. E., & Hartman, C. (2006). A right to housing: 
Foundation for a new social agenda. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press.
Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the geographies of 
“actually existing neoliberalism.” Antipode, 34(3), 349–379. 
Briggs, X.d.S., et al. (2005). Moving to opportunity in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina: A scholar’s petition. cambridge, MA: New Vision 
Institute.
The Brookings Institution. (2005). New Orleans after the storm: Lessons 
from the past, a plan for the future. Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution Metropolitan Policy Program.
Brown, S. (2006, June 14). MIT assists $1.2 billion New Orleans 
project. MITnews. Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://web.mit.edu/
newsoffi ce/2006/katrina-dusp.html 
Browne-Dianis, J., & Sinha, A. (2008). Exiling the poor: The clash of 
redevelopment and fair housing in post-Katrina New Orleans. Howard 
Law Journal, 51(3), 481–508.
Clark, A., & Rose, K. (2007). Bringing Louisiana renters home: An 
evaluation of the 2006–2007 Gulf Opportunity Zone Rental Housing 
Restoration Program. Retrieved August 29, 2010, from http://
www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97c6d565-bb43-406d-a6d5-
eca3bbf35af0%7D/RINGINGLOUISIANARENTERSHOME_
FINAL.PDF 
Davis, D. E. (1999). The power of distance: Re-theorizing social 
movements in Latin America. Thory and Society, 28(4), 585–638.
Dawson, M.C. (2006). After the deluge: Publics and publicity in 
Katrina’s wake. Du Bois Review, 3(1), 239–249.
Diani, M. (2003). Leaders’ or brokers? Positions and infl uence in social 
movement networks. In M. Diani & D. McAdam (Eds.), Social move-
ments and networks: Relational approaches to collective action (pp. 105–
122). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, P. (2006a.) Katrina and power in America. Urban Affairs Review, 
41(4), 528–549.
Dreier, P. (2006b). Katrina: A political disaster. Shelterforce. Retrieved 
August 28, 2010, from http://nhi.org/online/issues/145/politicaldisaster.
html 
Evans, D. (2008, December 10). Is HUD locking the poor out of New 
Orleans? Facing South. Retrieved August 29, 2010, from http://www.
southernstudies.org/2008/12/human-rights-violations-at-home-is-hud-
locking-the-poor-out-of-new-orleans.html 
Ferguson, R. F., & Stoutland, S. (1999). Reconceiving the community 
development fi eld. In R. F. Ferguson & W. T. Dickens (Eds.), Urban 
problems and community development (pp. 33–68). Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution.
Filosa, G. (2006, January 19). Home Depot gets turf in public housing; 
Lease opens debate on agency priorities. The Times-Picayune, p. 1. 
Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Gelinas, N. (2008). The Big Easy rebuilds, bottom up. City Journal, 
18(2). Retrieved August 29, 2010, from http://www.city-journal.
org/2008/18_2_new_orleans_rebuilds.html 
Giroux, H. A. (2006). Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, class, and the 
biopolitics of disposability. College Literature, 33(3), 171–196.
Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2001). Passionate politics: 
Emotions and social movements. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Gotham, K. F., & Greenberg, M. (2008). From 9/11 to 8/29: Post-
disaster recovery and rebuilding in New York and New Orleans. Social 
Forces, 87(2), 1039–1062. 
Graham, L. (2006a, April 12). Community organizing post-Katrina. Talk 
given to the Housing, Community & Economic Development program 
group, Department of Urban Studies & Planning, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
Graham, L. (2006b, August 28). Public response to my interview. 
Retrieved August 29, 2010, from http://grahamad.wordpress.
com/2006/08/28/public-response-to-my-interview/#comments 
Graham, L. (2009). Amnesty International USA’s Rebuilding the Gulf 
Coast: Final evaluation report. New York, NY: The Mertz Gilmore Foun-
dation.
Graham, L. (2010). Planning Tremé: The community development fi eld in 
a post-Katrina world (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Graham, L. (2012). Advancing the human right to housing in post-
Katrina New Orleans: Discursive opportunity structures in housing and 
community development. Housing Policy Debate, 22(1), 5–27.
Harrisburg Housing Authority to join nationwide ‘Day of Silence’ 
to protest funding cuts; local layoffs possible. (2007, January 9). PR 
Newswire. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/harrisburg-housing-authority-to-join-nationwide-
day-of-silence-to-protest-funding-cuts-local-layoffs-possible-53356982.
html 
Hirsch, A. R., & Levert, A. L. (2009). The Katrina conspiracies: The 
problem of trust in rebuilding an American city. Journal of Urban 
History, 35(2), 207–219.
Joseph, M. L., Chaskin, R. J., & Webber, H. S. (2007). The theoretical 
basis for addressing poverty through mixed-income development. Urban 
Affairs Review, 42(3), 369–409.
Kingsley, K. (2007). New Orleans architecture: Building renewal. 
Journal of American History, 94(3), 716–725.
Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, networks, motiva-
tions and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements. 
American Sociological Review, 52(4), 519–531.
Kurtz, H. (2005, September 19). Wiped off the map, and belatedly put 
back on it. The Washington Post. Retrieved May 1, 2009, from http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/18/
AR2005091801265.html 
Lowe, J. S. (2006). Rebuilding communities the public trust way: Com-
munity foundation assistance to CDCs, 1980–2000. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books.
Luft, R. E. (2009). Beyond disaster exceptionalism: Social movement 
developments in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. American 
Quarterly, 61(3), 499–527. 
MacCash, D. (2011, February 13). New Orleans was a pioneer in 
public housing. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved September 12, 2012, 
from http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/02/new_orleans_
was_a_pioneer_in_p.html
Mays, J. C. (2007, January 31). Booker and Healy protest HUD cuts to 
the cities. The Star-Ledger. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://jclist.
com/modules/newbb/viewtopic.php?post_id=93159 
RJPA_A_738143.indd   478 11/26/12   8:16:07 AM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
n J
ay
 C
oll
eg
e o
f C
rim
ina
l J
us
tic
e],
 [L
eig
h G
rah
am
] a
t 1
3:2
0 1
2 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
Graham: Razing Lafi tte 479
Muhammad, S. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: The Black nation’s 9/11! A 
strategic perspective for self-determination. Socialism and Democracy, 
20(2), 3–17. 
Olshansky, R. B., and Johnson, L.A. (2010). Clear as mud: Planning for 
the rebuilding of New Orleans. Chicago, IL: APA Press.
Ouroussoff, N. (2007, February 22). History vs. homogeneity in New 
Orleans housing fi ght. The New York Times, p. E1. 
Parks, J. (2006, June 14). AFL-CIO announces $1 billion housing and 
economic development program to rebuild Gulf Coast. Retrieved 
August 29, 2010, from http://209.29.149.17/2006/06/14/afl -cio-
announces-1-billion-housing-and-economic-development-program-to-
rebuild-gulf-coast/ 
Peck, J. (2006). Liberating the city: Between New York and New 
Orleans. Urban Geography, 27(8), 681–713.
Polman, D. (2005, September 18). GOP will feel anger of black 
electorate. Philadelphia Inquirer, p. A01. 
Popkin, S. J., Levy, D. K., & Buron, L. (2009). Has HOPE VI trans-
formed residents’ lives? New evidence from the HOPE VI panel study. 
Housing Studies, 24(4), 477–502. 
Powell, L.N. (2007). What does American history tell us about Katrina 
and vice versa? Journal of American History, 94(3), 863–877.
Providence/Enterprise Partnership with the Tremé/Lafi tte Commu-
nity. (n.d.) Retrieved August 12, 2010, from http://www.providence-
communityhousing.org/%282%29%20ORIGINAL%20PRESS%20
RELEASE%20Providence-Enterprise.pdf 
Providence/Enterprise Plan for the Tremé/Lafi tte Community and 
answers to Frequently Asked Questions. (2008, April). Retrieved 
August 12, 2010, from http://www.providencecommunityhousing.org/
Providence-Enterprise_Plan_&_FAQs_(April-08).pdf 
Right to the City Alliance. (2010). We call these projects home: 
Solving the housing crisis from the ground up. Retrieved August 29, 
2010, from http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/We_Call_
These_Projects_Home.pdf 
Rivera, M. T., Soderstrom, S. B., and Uzzi, B. (2010). Dynamics of 
dyads in social networks: Assortative, relational, and proximity mecha-
nisms. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 91–115.
Sanyika, M. (2009). Katrina and the condition of Black New Orleans: 
The struggle for justice, equity and democracy. In. R. D. Bullard & B. 
Wright (Eds.), Race, place, and environmental justice after Hurricane 
Katrina: Struggles to reclaim, rebuild and revitalize New Orleans and the 
Gulf Coast (pp. 87–114). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Shortt‚ S. (2007, Feburary 13). Fears about public housing show city 
hall’s disconnect. BeyondChron. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://
www.beyondchron.org/news/index.php?itemid=4191 
Sinha, A. (2009, May 11). Damaged roots in the fi ght for public housing? 
San Francisco Bay View. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://sfbayview.
com/2009/damaged-roots-in-the-fi ght-for-public-housing/
Slater, T. (2006). The eviction of critical perspectives from gentrifi cation 
research. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(4), 
737–757.
Sullivan, K. (2005, September 4). How could this be happening in the 
United States? The Washington Post. Retrieved May 1, 2009, from http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/
AR2005090301433.html 
Thomas, E. (2005, September 19). How Bush blew it: Bureaucratic 
timidity. Bad phone lines. And a failure of imagination. Why the 
government was so slow to respond to catastrophe. Newsweek. Retrieved 
August 12, 2010, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9287434/ 
Thompson, J. P. (2009). Response to “Post-disaster planning in New 
Orleans.” Journal of Planning Education and Research, 28(3), 403–404.
Wellman, B. (1983). Network analysis: Some basic principles. Sociologi-
cal Theory, 1(1), 55–200.
White, D. (2006, June 14). HUD outlines aggressive plan to bring 
families back to New Orleans public housing. HUD 06-066. Retrieved 
September 12, 2010, from http://archives.hud.gov/news/2006/pr06-066.
cfm 
RJPA_A_738143.indd   479 11/26/12   8:16:07 AM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
n J
ay
 C
oll
eg
e o
f C
rim
ina
l J
us
tic
e],
 [L
eig
h G
rah
am
] a
t 1
3:2
0 1
2 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
480 Journal of the American Planning Association, Autumn 2012, Vol. 78, No. 4
Appendix
Figure A-1. Neighborhoods in Orleans Parish.  On the map, Tremé/Lafi tte is upriver from the French Quarter and downriver from City Park and Bayou 
St. John. 
Source: Reproduced by permission of Greater New Orleans Community Data Center.
(Color fi gure available online.)
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